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Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

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Canada Buys 'PowerWalk' Kinetic Energy Harvester

Global Defense Security news 15 Dec 2017

Bionic Power has received a contract valued at CDN\$1.16 million, under the Government of Canada's Build in Canada Innovation Program (BCIP), to supply low-volume production units of its PowerWalk® Kinetic Energy Harvester to the Director of Land Requirements (DLR) and Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) for field testing with the Canadian Armed Forces. The Honourable Carla Qualtrough, Minister of Public Services and Procurement, announced the BCIP contracts on December 8 at the BC Tech Association Hub, in Vancouver.

Bionic Power will supply the units in early December, immediately following delivery of previously announced units entering field trials with the US Marine Corps and US Army. The Canadian Armed Forces will share trial results with Bionic Power as soon as field testing is finished, and this information will be available to other militaries looking to purchase harvesters. "Having PowerWalk units in field tests with multiple military customers supports ongoing product refinement and prepares us for volume production. It also sends a clear signal that our target military customers have confidence in our product and its potential to reduce risks and costs and improve mission effectiveness," says Yad Garcha, Bionic Power's Chief Executive Officer. "Every customer has different requirements, from technical specs for batteries to the look of the camouflage. While we know we can deliver the product our customers ask for, they need to see and prove for themselves that our technology delivers."

The PowerWalk is a light-weight, leg-mounted exoskeleton designed to accommodate a soldier's full range of motion and harvest energy from the natural action of walking, in much the same way regenerative braking works in hybrid cars. Military organizations around the world are looking for ways to improve soldier safety while lowering mission costs and risks. Wearing a PowerWalk harvester mitigates the need for extra batteries, reducing the weight a soldier carries while providing continuous life-saving power in the field. The PowerWalk also reduces or eliminates logistical tail challenges, results in a smaller environmental footprint, and can increase mission duration and effectiveness. All these features provide a compelling value proposition for military decision makers. Canadian Armed Forces testing of Bionic Power's PowerWalk device will take place in early 2018.

See the RUSI Calendar of Events
on last page .

Airbus Reveals Future New Fighter Concept

Gareth Jennings, *HIS Jane's International Defence Review*


Summary & Analysis: Looks half F-22, half F-35.

Airbus Defence and Space (DS) has revealed a New Fighter concept that could serve as a potential replacement for the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale in the 2040-timeframe. Speaking at the IQPC International Fighter conference in Berlin on 8 November, the company's head of strategy, Antoine Noguier, disclosed that the manned New Fighter would be part of a family of systems known as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS).

"Germany and France have taken the decision to develop a new combat aircraft to maintain sovereign and European capabilities. We see the Future Combat Air System as being a family of

systems composed of manned and unmanned platforms that need to operate in a collective and collaborative way. We see a great future with the current [Eurofighter] platform, and we are developing the New Fighter also as a key element of this Future Combat Air System," Noguier said. Airbus first revealed details of its FCAS work for the German Bundeswehr in mid-2016, at which time it was being pitched as a potential successor to the Luftwaffe's Panavia Tornado fleet. However, given the compressed timelines involved in that particular effort (the service needs to field a replacement in 2025 in time for a 2030 out-of-service date), the FCAS in general and the New Fighter in particular is now being seen more as a potential replacement for the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is due to be retired from German service in about 2045.

Given the collaborative arrangement agreed between Germany and France earlier this year on the development of a future European fighter aircraft, the New Fighter is also envisaged as a Rafale replacement for the French Air Force.



The Problem with Military Procurement in Canada is the Military Always Comes Last

The National Shipbuilding Strategy is becoming a disaster because procurement here is about regional development, bureaucratic empire-building, and jobs for the boys

Andrew Coyne: The National Post Dec 14, 2017

The National Shipbuilding Strategy, they called it: a \$38 billion, multi-year plan to supply new vessels to the Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Navy out of shipyards in Halifax and Vancouver. Seven years later, the national part is consumed by provincial infighting, no ships have been built and God knows what's left of the strategy.

Years behind schedule, tens of billions of dollars over budget, the program that was supposed to showcase lessons learned from previous procurement disasters — helicopters, submarines, fighter jets, you name it — is fast turning into one itself. The reason is the same as ever: because procurement in this country is never about procurement, that is, obtaining the best equipment at the lowest price. It is about regional development, and bureaucratic empire-building, and jobs for the boys. The military comes last.

The most recent, and spectacular, installment in this long-running series of fiascos came with last week's close of bidding on the Strategy's largest single component, the purchase of 15 frigates to replace the Navy's current fleet. Originally budgeted at \$26 billion, the project is now estimated to cost at least \$62 billion, depending on how much further it is delayed. This, even after the incoming Liberal government announced it would no longer insist on custom-designing the frigates from scratch, but would buy designs off the shelf.

At the last minute, a Franco-Italian consortium pitched a proposal directly to the defence minister, circumventing the usual bidding process. It would build the frigates at Halifax's Irving Shipbuilding for a guaranteed price of \$30 billion — potentially saving the taxpayer \$32 billion, as Postmedia's David Pugliese first reported. Moreover, the consortium, involving two of the world's largest shipbuilders, France's Naval Group and Italy's Fincantieri,

claimed to be able to start delivery in 2019, rather than the 2021 start date currently envisaged.

The department — not Defence, but Public Services, which took over procurement from Defence after the F-35 debacle — was having none of it. The reason? Get this: fairness. “The submission of an unsolicited proposal at the final hour undermines the fair and competitive nature of this procurement,” the department said. “Acceptance of such a proposal would break faith with the bidders who invested time and effort to participate in the competitive process.”

This sort of rules-are-rules punctiliousness would be more believable were the department not already widely suspected of having skewed the bidding process in favour of a rival proposal from Lockheed Martin Canada and Britain's BAE — a timeworn practice inherited from Defence. But when the potential savings are as large as that, it seems preposterous to reject the Fincantieri-Naval Group proposal out of hand, merely because the proper forms were not filled out.

The department is skeptical of the consortium's claims, which is fair enough. But it hardly has a sterling track record itself. Virtually every other part of the Strategy is in trouble. Neither of the two supply ships commissioned under the Joint Support Ship Project, to be built by Vancouver-based Seaspan, has even begun construction, in part because the shipyard is still wrestling with the four fisheries patrol vessels it is supposed to deliver to the Coast Guard.

A navy is not much use without supply ships, so as a stopgap the government asked Quebec's Davie Shipyard to refit a commercial vessel for the purpose. That having been accomplished, the company wants to be given the contract for another, with the increasingly vocal support of Quebec's political class.

At a rally last week, the premier, Philippe Couillard, demanded that Davie be given a larger share of federal shipbuilding work. “We're asking for equality,” he said. “We are asking for justice. We're not asking for charity, we're just asking for our fair share.” But all of the work on the National Shipbuilding Strategy was contracted to the two coastal yards (at the time, Davie was essentially bankrupt.) So either some of that work would have to be taken away

from them and given to Quebec — good luck with that — or the federal government would have to come up with a reason to build still more ships.

So far the feds appear to be holding firm. “We cannot artificially create a need that does not exist,” federal Transport Minister Marc Garneau was heard to explain the other day. But of course they can, and do. If the federal government were not in the business of artificially creating procurement needs, it would not insist on building all new ships, all in Canada, rather than either refitting existing ships, as in the Davie example, or buying or even renting them from abroad: all demonstrably cheaper alternatives, and quicker, too.

But that assumes that kitting out the military is the government’s first priority, rather than keeping Canadian shipyard workers employed. It isn’t only Davie that is grumbling. Facing a bit of downtime between building the third and fourth Coast Guard vessel, Seaspan is publicly soliciting the feds to provide it with new work. Irving, likewise, is nearing completion of six Arctic offshore patrol ships (though stay tuned: the union has just voted to give its leaders a strike mandate) and has nothing else in the pipeline until the frigate project begins. Which may explain the government’s reluctance to wait for three demo models to be built overseas.

All three shipyards are warning of layoffs if Ottawa doesn’t keep them constantly supplied with new projects, even as existing projects lag behind schedule. The military, once again, comes last.

Recommended for You

Links to important articles:

Five Maps that explain China’s Strategy

<http://www.businessinsider.com/5-maps-that-explain-chinas-strategy-2016-1?op=1/#ethnolinguistic-groups-1>

RCN dropping 'draconian' policy on warship Wi-Fi

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/navy-warship-wifi-1.4481346>

East Coast Sea Kings set to retire, but replacements face growing pains

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/sea-king-retirement-east-coast-cyclone-replacement-1.4459985>

Canadian Military Makes Headway on Sex Assault Nearly Three Years after its #MeToo Revelation

Globe and Mail 19 Jan 2018

Optimistic voices suggest the widespread exposure of sexual misconduct by powerful men has caused a cultural shift, making it more difficult for abusers to abuse and harassers to harass. But the moral journey that began last summer in Hollywood and spread to politics and the media is a well-trodden path for Canada's military.

Two and a half years after Jonathan Vance announced at his swearing in as Chief of Defence Staff that the "harmful behaviour" would not be tolerated, measurable improvements are being made.

Sex assaults still happen, though Gen. Vance would like to believe they occur less frequently than they did in 2015 when former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps found a "sexualized culture" within the Armed Forces, or in 2016 when nearly 1,000 military personnel told Statistics Canada they had been sexually assaulted within the previous 12 months.

But reports of abuse – and especially reports from bystanders – are up, charges are up, convictions are up. Rules around what will not be tolerated are better understood. And the treatment of victims by the chain of command and by military prosecutors has changed.

"I would say we are at the middle of the beginning. We have a long way to go," said Gen. Vance, who launched what is known as Operation Honour in the summer of 2015 to combat sexual abuse within the ranks.

When a report of an assault is lodged by or about military personnel anywhere in the country, Gen. Vance is notified "at the same speed that I would get a missile warning." He is constantly informed of the numbers by a variety of sources including the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre (SMRC), which opened in September of 2015 and operates a hotline allowing military personnel to report sexual misconduct without going to their superiors.

"It's like feeling the enemy activity when you are a commander in the field," said Gen. Vance. "What it does is keep us all motivated, knowing that it hasn't gone away, that there is still more to do."

The most recent numbers suggest the reporting of sexual misconduct has increased dramatically. Between 2010 and 2015, there was an average of 88 complaints a year. Be-

tween 2015 and 2017, the annual average was 159. As a result of Forces-wide training, 40 per cent of those reports are coming from third-party witnesses.

"You're at a function and you see someone who ought not to be placing their hand on someone else, you report; you say 'I object,'" said Gen. Vance

Prior to Operation Honour, 25 per cent of all of sexual-assault complaints were deemed to be unfounded. Since the operation began, that figure has dropped to 14 per cent. Four years ago, sexual misconduct was a factor in 14 per cent of all charges laid by military police. That has climbed to 25 per cent.

Michel Drapeau, a former military colonel who is now a lawyer in private practice and has represented many military assault victims, says the fact that they are still coming to him means sexual assault continues to occur in the Armed Forces. But "I think the culture has changed to the degree that there is now an air of reprobation," said Col. Drapeau. "It's no longer a smile and a wink and we'll throw this under the covers."

On the other hand, there is still no Victims Bill of Rights in military justice as there is in the civilian world, said Col. Drapeau. That bill ensures, among other things, that people who lodge sexual-assault complaints are informed about the progress of their case, can make a victim-impact statement and have a right to redress.

Colonel Bruce MacGregor, the director of military prosecutions, recognizes that sexual-assault victims who pursue justice through the court-martial system cannot rely on those legislated rights. But, he said, he has spent the past couple of years rewriting policies for military prosecutions to take the best of the Victims Bill of Rights and put it into practice in the military system.

For instance, Ms. Deschamps recommended in her report that sexual-assault victims be allowed to express their opinion about whether their cases should be handled by a civilian or military court. Col. MacGregor has decreed that his prosecutors must ask the victim for their views on jurisdiction – even if the final decision rests with him. Prosecutors are also told that victims must be kept up to date about the progress of their cases. "If there is a lack of communication," he said, "that's against our direction."

There is an effort to limit the number of times a victim has to tell their story and to ensure that the same prosecutor handles a case from start to finish. And military prosecutors must put pressure on defence counsel to allow victim-impact statements.

Col. MacGregor has also hired Lieutenant-Colonel Maureen Pecknold, a reservist and senior mentor to the Ontario Crown on sexual-assault cases, to be the part-time director of his sexual-misconduct prosecutions team. The end result of all of the actions has been success for prosecutors of sexual assault at courts martial.

Statistics Canada data released last fall show that sexual-assault charges in the civilian system result in convictions 55 per cent of the time, with the accused being found guilty of sexual assault in 24 per cent of cases, and guilty of a lesser charge in 31 per cent of cases.

In Canadian courts martial between 2009 and 2017, sexual-assault charges resulted in convictions in 70 per cent of cases – 31 per cent of them findings of guilty of sexual assault and 39 per cent guilty of lesser charges.

Lieutenant-Commander JoAnne Carter, a naval intelligence officer and full-time reservist who joined the military in 1983, says the new culture allowed her to bring criminal charges against a civilian woman who grabbed her breast in front of a group of men, most of them senior officers, at a military training function in April, 2016.

The incident happened on a Friday evening and on Monday morning, LCdr. Carter called the SMRC hotline, who informed the military police.

"The next day, the military police set up an interview for me and they couldn't have been more professional, kinder or sensitive," she said. Meanwhile, one of the men who has witnessed the assault had independently reported it to the course director.

Without Operation Honour "I would have been thinking 'is it that serious, is it really that bad?' " said LCdr. Carter. "If it wasn't for Op Honour, I probably would have downplayed it and let it sort of percolate."

Instead, the woman was charged with sexual assault and pleaded guilty last November in a civilian court to a lesser charge of assault. LCdr. Carter's victim impact statement was read at her sentencing hearing, which, she said, gives her great comfort.

The military is planning to repeat last year's Statistics Canada survey on sexual assault within the ranks in the fall of 2018 and will again make the results public, for better or for worse.

"It ought to show that Op Honour is having an impact," said Gen. Vance. But "whatever the results are, it's going to give us course-correction type information."

In retrospect, the Deschamps report was the military's #MeToo moment. It said sexual assault and harassment are significant detractors from the quality of life, the professional life, in the Armed Forces, said Gen. Vance. "We took it seriously."

How an Expeditionary Military will grow Canada's Soft Power

.By Declan Hodgins, The General Assembly (a student run international relations publication www.thegeneralassembly.ca) 29 October 2017

Declan Hodgins is a Third Year Business and International Relations student at the University of Western Ontario and has served as a Senior Editor of The General Assembly Publication since its inception in October 2017. He is also the President of Western Model UN. His areas of interest include Military History, Military Science, Partisan Politics, and Public Policy. He can be reached at dhodgin6@uwo.ca.

It is well established that since the Cold War, Canada's military has been underfunded compared to other nations of similar international stature. In a recent defence review, the Canadian government raised planned defence expenditure from less than 1% of its GDP to 1.5%. While this continues to fall short of NATO's 2% of GDP requirement, it is certainly an improvement. However, while this funding improves the size of our military, the Canadian Armed Forces continue to lack a key capability that the defence review ignores.

Canada's military is severely lacking in expeditionary capacity. The logistical ability to project the power that we have across the globe, known in military circles as expeditionary capability, would allow the Canadian Armed Forces to significantly increase not only hard power but also its soft power through enhanced humanitarian and diplomatic action.

Even though Canada's size and stature on the world stage would dictate that we would already have an expeditionary capability, Canada's military continues to be underfunded largely due to its two national mythologies. The first holds that we are a peacekeeping nation, rather than a war-fighting nation. Second, the Militia Myth states that Canada need not have a powerful standing army, as it can instead raise a Citizen's militia in times of war. These have served as excuses for politicians to cut funding for our military and kneecap its expeditionary capabilities. As a result, our military is currently in a dire state of readiness.

Our army, while decently sized at 3 mechanized brigades, has no significant standing airborne formations and no capability for amphibious assault. Our Navy is effectively a coastal defence force given the absence of fleet replenishment ships. Our Air Force is small, old, and has few airlift and air refuelling assets. Canada is virtually incapable of independent military action and is really only able to contribute forces to coalitions led by larger nations.

By expanding our expeditionary forces, Canada will benefit from more than just an increase in hard power. The same assets that allow a military to be expeditionary are also ideal for supporting peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy, which are of benefit to our soft power.

Currently, Canada employs The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) as a component of the Canadian Armed Forces that can deploy on short notice to assist with natural and humanitarian disasters. And while it has served admirably in places such as Rwanda and Nepal, until quite recently, Canada had to charter aircraft from a private company to transport them into theatre; a fact that serves as an embarrassment for a G-7 nation. Although Canada recently acquired five C-17 strategic airlifters, they are scarcely adequate for our needs.

While the acquisitions of the C-17s is a good start, Canada should continue to grow its Strategic airlift capability, along with associated tanker assets, to give the military a greater facility to respond to crises. Strategic airlift can play a key role in transporting disaster assistance forces into theatre after a natural or humanitarian disaster, and can later be used to airlift supplies into affected regions.

To complement increased strategic airlift assets, Canada should also consider the establishment of a standing Airborne force. The same rapid response capability and deployability that makes airborne forces ideal for expeditionary warfare also makes them ideal for disaster response. In the past, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was often deployed in peacekeeping and disaster response roles. The capability lost when it was disbanded in 1995 has yet to be fully replaced.

After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the USA launched Operation Unified Assistance, a disaster relief mission. One of the most valuable assets in that mission was the USS Bonhomme Richard, an amphibious assault ship that had been on deployment in the Southwest Pacific at the time of the tsunami. The Bonhomme Richard had a reinforced squadron of transport helicopters, several landing craft, a fully equipped hos-

Message from the President RUSI VI

pital, a massive freshwater generation facility, and a battalion of Marines with attached logistics – in other words, the ideal disaster response force.

In countless occasions, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers have shown their utility in the event of a natural disaster. The USA, with its fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 31 amphibious warfare ships, has won itself considerable goodwill around the world through its ability to quickly and effectively respond to disasters. By acquiring amphibious warfare vessels for itself, such as the French-built Mistral-class ships, Canada would have a potent tool not only for use in war but also in responding to crisis events worldwide.

Many Canadians buy into Canada's two national mythologies and will assert the oft-repeated claim that Canada is too small to have an expeditionary military, but this is demonstrably false. Australia, a smaller nation than we are, has a powerful and expeditionary military. Our GDP exceeds that of Russia, one of the greatest military powers on earth. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the nation that took Juno Beach should currently possess an amphibious warfare capability, especially when it would be so potent a tool for responding to all types of international crisis.

If Canada wants to retain its international stature, it needs to expand its expeditionary capability. Advocates of a larger military for Canada need to stop solely framing the debate in terms of hard power. Conversely, advocates of a Canadian foreign policy based on peacekeeping and humanitarianism must realise that we can only effectively pursue that goal if we have credible expeditionary forces.

A more expeditionary military for Canada not only appeals to our proud history of warfare but also to our traditions of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. Canada cannot continue to rely on hastily assembled ad-hoc formations and militia mobilization to meet its international goals. In modern warfare, a well-trained, educated, and equipped standing military is a must; whether it is peacekeeping, conventional combat, or anywhere in between.

When Oliver Cromwell stated that "a ship of war makes the best ambassador", he was referring to the metaphorical "stick" in international relations. However, the quote is equally applicable in the context of soft power. If Canada adds a credible expeditionary capability to our military, we will be able to increase our clout on the full continuum of war and peace.

We have started off well since the September lunch, under Clive Caton's strong leadership, and I hope that I can continue his good work. We are looking forward to several good speakers at our lunches, which continue to be well attended.

In 2016, we presented a paper for the Defence Policy Review that was, reportedly, well received in Ottawa. However, as we all know from press reports and personal contacts, we seem to be no further ahead in providing our armed services with the support and equipment upgrades so desperately needed. Perhaps the time has come to contact our MPs to push harder for action on this front.

On the positive side, we should be thankful that the Government has not announced any reckless "peacekeeping" intervention in Africa, as was threatened. Perhaps there is some voice of reason being heard and understood in the corridors of power?

As usual, Skip Triplett has assembled an array of interesting, timely, and important articles for your reading in this issue. We are appreciative of the strong effort that he makes to keep us informed.

However good our lunch program, the work is done by the Executive members, many of whom have served for several years and now intend to take a well-earned break. We will thank them properly at the March AGM, but we need replacements. Clive Caton is working on this but I must ask you to strongly consider volunteering and sending your name to Clive at planet.catons@gmail.com. We need a Vice President, Treasurer, Functions Director, and Newsletter Editor, as well as someone to review the annual financials. Next year, there will be additional positions to fill. Without people willing to accept these roles, the club will collapse.

Roger Love

President RUSI Vancouver Island

Korea's Place in History

Stratfor 19 Feb 2018

The approach of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, may bring a respite, however brief, from the perception of imminent war on the Korean Peninsula. Feeling squeezed by the United States and China, the two sides of the 38th parallel agreed to resume talks with each other. Seoul and Pyongyang alike face economic pressure from Beijing, after all, and both fear Washington's military posturing, because while North Korea would be the target of a U.S. preventive war, South Korea would be its battleground. As the dialogue kicked off, Pyongyang and Seoul set out to shape their positions not only with regard to each other, but also in relation to other countries in the region. North Korea, for example, noted that it would not discuss its nuclear program because its missiles are aimed not at South Korea (or China or Russia) but only at the United States. And South Korea welcomed a dialogue limited to issues of mutual interest, such as the Olympics and ways to ease tensions in the demilitarized zone, while making clear that it would keep the United States and China in the loop about the talks. Both Koreas are playing a defensive game against larger powers.

The need for Pyongyang and Seoul to frame even their bilateral dialogue in regional terms reflects Korea's long-standing reality as a nation trapped between larger powers. Throughout history, Korea has been at times a buffer state, at times a bridgehead — the proverbial minnow between whales. The role of a buffer state is to create a space between bigger competing countries, to ease the political, economic, social and military tensions between its larger neighbors.

Caught in the Middle

As a peninsula, Korea frequently has served as a buffer between land powers as well as maritime powers. The Korean Peninsula, jutting out from the intersection of the Russian and Chinese empires, provides a protective shield around the Yellow Sea, guarding the passage to Tianjin and to the ports closest to Beijing. From the continent, it points toward the Japanese islands — the peninsula lies only 100 kilometers (62 miles) away from Tsushima island and another hundred from the tangent point between Honshu and Kyushu. Though Japan's population and

port infrastructure are concentrated largely on the Pacific coast, the country has sometimes regarded the Korean Peninsula as a dagger pointed at it, a bridge from the Asian continent. At various points in its history, Korea has acted as a buffer between China and Japan, Japan and Russia, China and the United States, and even the European imperial powers and China.

Serving as a buffer offers a sense of national security, deterring larger powers from dominating the country they depend on for strategic depth. That security, however, often comes at a cost to sovereignty. For several hundred years, Korea accepted Chinese suzerainty as a way to discourage other powers from encroaching on its territory. North Korea similarly has depended on China and Russia for its security since the Cold War, while South Korea has relied on the United States — each to the detriment of its freedom of action. Both North and South Korea, and the unified state they once were, have often chafed at their semidependent relationships and tried to strengthen their national economies, societies and militaries to reassert their independence. Korea tried to expand at times, mainly into what is now Northeast China, in response to nomadic threats from the north or to China's internal weakness. In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea, against the advice of the United States, worked to develop heavy industry and briefly pursued a nuclear weapon of its own. And North Korea has turned to military might and an advancing nuclear missile program to ensure its national security and independence.

A Transitory State

The problem for buffer states like Korea is that they are often in transitory positions, subject to the changing dynamics of the larger powers around. A buffer serves a purpose so long as the powers competing around it are more or less evenly matched, or so long as they have an interest in ensuring a defensive space between them. But it can quickly become a bridge, a path between powers, when that balance is knocked off kilter.

After conquering northern China in the 13th century, for instance, the Mongols overran Korea and used it as a jumping off point for their (ultimately abortive) invasion of Japan. Japan, in turn, invaded Korea in the late 1500s in a failed attempt to take China. A few hundred years later in the late 1800s, a weakening China left Korea vulnerable to the advances of competing European and Asian powers. France and the United States made moves on the peninsula through political means; Moscow, too, eyed Korea — then the buffer between the expanding Russian Empire and Japan — as a potential location for ice-free ports. Once Japan

defeated first the Chinese navy in 1894 and then the Russian navy in 1905, it finally absorbed Korea, the bridgehead in its broader attempt to overtake China and expand its empire across Asia. And the end of World War II left Korea divided, a buffer between the Soviet and U.S. blocs.

Today, China continues to treat North Korea as a buffer space that separates the Chinese borders from U.S. forces in South Korea and from any future Japanese expansion. The United States, meanwhile, sees South Korea as part of a buffer between the expanding Asian powers and the U.S. mainland. Although the two Koreas, and North Korea in particular, have been able at times to exploit the differences among the competing regional powers, they have not been able to fully shape their own security environment.

Divided, North and South are inherently weak, fighting each other and serving as the front line in a contest between regional powers. Even unified, it's unclear whether Korea would be able to proactively influence its own security environment. Geography has placed Korea at the confluence of bigger powers, and each of these powers has an interest in discouraging the nation's reunification, or at least in making sure rival powers don't exert inordinate sway over the peninsula. A truly strong and independent Korea is something no regional power wants. A unified but weak Korea, on the other hand, may be acceptable as a defensive buffer; even without the social and economic challenges inherent in reunification, a united Korea would likely find itself back in a defensive role.


An Evolving Struggle

Historically, Korea has responded to its position either by taking an isolationist approach to foreign policy — earning the reputation of "hermit kingdom" — or by try-

ing to play the larger regional powers off one another. The tactics remain at the core of the strategies North and South Korea employ to this day: Pyongyang still pursues isolation, while South Korea prefers to deflect the competition around it. Decades of division, rivalry, warfare and subversion, however, have complicated these policies.

Today each Korea is struggling with its geographic and historical reality. South Korean President Moon Jae In walks a fine line between his outreach to Pyongyang and his security relationship with Washington; between his country's ties with China and its ties with the United States; and between South Korea's historical antagonism toward Japan and the need to work within the U.S. alliance structure. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, likewise, may have tried to back away from Beijing's influence, but his country cannot simply turn against China or Russia. What's more, though North Korea is closer than ever to achieving a nuclear program it hopes will give it the strength to reshape its relations with the larger powers, it is also vulnerable to Moscow's and Beijing's perception that its nuclear program is threatening their interests.

It is in this context that we must consider the current round of inter-Korean dialogue. Seoul and Pyongyang are trying to reclaim some control over their own fates, but they remain reliant on, and thus constrained by, their primary economic and military partners. The Cold War may be over, but Korea remains at the center of a competition between China and Russia on one side and the United States and Japan on the other. And though their circumstances can change, their location won't.



Russia Is Building Laser-Armed Nuclear Combat Icebreakers

Michael Peck, *The National Interest & Gear & Tech*
July 27, 2017

More details are emerging about Russia's trump card for control of the Arctic: laser-armed, nuclear-powered "combat icebreakers." In addition to a warship-sized array of weapons, the 8,500-ton Ivan Papanin-class vessels will mount powerful lasers that can cut through ice—and possibly through enemies as well. They will join a fleet of forty existing Russian icebreakers. The United States is now down to two, even as the United States, Canada and other nations are focusing on the Arctic, where melting ice offer the lure of fresh mineral deposits and new commercial shipping routes. The first of these icebreakers was laid down in April, according to Russian news site Sputnik News. "The multipurpose vessel is conceived as an all-in-one Navy warship, icebreaker and tugboat," measuring 361 feet long, and with a speed of sixteen knots and a range of six thousand nautical miles. The Ivan Papanin-class ships, also known as Project 23550, will be fitted with a "modular armament suite," Russian defense-industry sources told Jane's 360 in April. Sputnik News cites a Russian analyst who claims that "in addition to radio-electronic equipment and its heavy-duty hull, Project 23550 icebreakers will include the ability to deploy missile weapons...The Kalibr-NK [cruise missile] system's launch containers can be placed comfortably on the ship behind the helicopter landing pad. A total of eight launchers can be deployed onboard."

The same analyst also raises an intriguing possibility: an Ivan Papanin-class icebreaker could "rescue an intruder vessel that's been caught in the ice, and tow it" to another location. This suggests that these Russian icebreakers won't necessarily sink vessels deemed to illegally be in Russian territory: if those ships are stuck in ice, the icebreakers will tow the hapless intruder back to a Russian port to stand trial. And that's where the lasers come in. "Later this year, scientists aboard the Dixon, a Russian diesel-powered icebreaker operating in the White Sea, will begin testing of a 30-kilowatt ship-based laser, designed specifically for easing the movement of ships operating in the Arctic environment," Sputnik News said. "The project involves experts from the Moscow-based Astrofizika Design Institute, with the assistance of St. Petersburg's Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute." A Russian physicist told Russian media that the new laser is designed as an ice cutter rather than a weapon. "We're

talking about easing as much as possible navigation through northern regions. In addition, it's necessary to test empirically calculations, create the system, measure energy consumption and calculate many other parameters. For the first stage, his is enough." It's the following stages that will be interesting. As the United States discovered during its attempt fifteen years ago to create the YAL-1, a giant chemically powered antimissile laser mounted on a 747, a powerful laser has a powerful appetite for energy. But that isn't stopping Russia from trying to develop a two-hundred-kilowatt laser for its icebreakers (by comparison, the U.S. Army just took delivery of a truck-mounted antimissile laser with a power of just sixty kilowatts).

A laser powerful enough to cut through six feet of ice would probably prove equally formidable against missiles and drones, and perhaps even other ships. However, what's really significant here isn't the lasers. It's the attention that Russia is paying to fighting in the Arctic, from icebreaker-warships to rugged anti-aircraft missiles. That's more than the United States is doing, and more than a small but Arctic-savvy nation like Canada can afford. Russia has proven prescient at anticipating future warfare, from devising mechanized-warfare theory in the 1930s to unconventional hybrid warfare today. Does Moscow know something about the Arctic that America doesn't?

When Tanks Were Tanked

Gary Del Villano, 14 Jan 2018 (Gary is a RUSI VI Member and the lead on our Oral Military History Program)

This was on the front burner many years ago when I was in Germany. We fought hard to maintain the Main Battle Tank (MTB) as a necessary weapon for NATO service. At the time, we understood that the German chancellor made it clear that it was the price of a seat at NATO. Not long after, we leased, then purchased Leopard 1, the last to do so of all the NATO armies that were so equipped, from Italy to Norway.

To our disgust, the government mothballed all MBTs on such grounds that they were no longer necessary, too heavy to transport strategically and all units were equipped only with LAVs. We tankers dismissed LAVs as "too big to hide and too small to fight their way out of trouble".

Then came Afghanistan and the defence minister, a former CO RCD supported bringing back the tanks. In due course, it was concluded that we needed the heavier Leopard 2 and we leased it while managing a program

to buy the the Dutch army tanks. Those are the tanks we now have in the Strathconas (in Edmonton) and with a joint RCD/12 RBC squadron in Gagetown at the Combat Training Centre.

This year, a student will interview* three former members of a Strathcona Squadron that served in Afghanistan. To this day, I believe only Canada used MBTs in Afghanistan. And, they proved not only very successful, but they significantly cut the number of casualties of our own troops. Oh, and the conclusion that they could not be moved easily because of their size and weight was always false. We flew them, two at a time, to Afghanistan using either Russian/Ukrainian transport aircraft or the USAF C-5 aircraft.

*(in the Oral Military History program run in conjunction with University of Victoria)

Legalization of pot presents conundrum for Canadian military

By Murray Brewster, CBC News, Jan 05, 2018

Ensuring its soldiers, sailors and aircrew are not the slightest bit stoned as they go out the door to war or other hazards is the subject of intense study and debate as the Canadian military looks ahead to this year's expected legalization of marijuana.

The army, navy, air force and special forces are not your average workplaces, and the senior commander in charge of military personnel says he won't hesitate to recommend restrictions and screening should the need arise.

"We're concerned about how folks will be able to do their job," Lt.-Gen. Chuck Lamarre told CBC News. "And we are concerned about folks who have the challenges of operating heavy equipment, weaponry, who are on call on a regular basis to go and do things, like our [search and rescue] technicians."

The Liberal government's legislation to legalize and regulate recreational use of marijuana is before the Senate. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, in an interview before Christmas, said it would be "next summer" before it becomes law.

Workplace safety has figured in some aspects of the pot debate, but Lamarre said the potential for increased use and acceptance among the general population brings with it pressing national security concerns. "We have to be able to protect the Canadian Armed Forces' ability to be able to send men and women — at a moment's notice — to operate in some very, very dangerous and demanding environments," he said.

Since last spring, a team of military policy experts, including medical, legal and officers on operational duty, has been examining the implications of the legislation and what poli-

cies might have to change.

Lamarre said it's too soon to know if there will be limits on marijuana use, but he is prepared to "recommend or propose control measures" as long as there's scientific research to back them up.

Employers in the civilian world can prohibit drug and alcohol use in the workplace, with some exceptions for medical marijuana patients.

The military has limited and even banned the consumption of alcohol in specific circumstances, notably in Afghanistan.

There is a long-established drug testing policy for "safety-sensitive" positions and — as recently as five years ago — National Defence faced an intense internal lobbying campaign from senior commanders who wanted to see the list of jobs subject to screening drastically expanded.

That push failed, and Lamarre noted that, from the point of view of legal rights, the military has to be "very careful how we apply" randomized testing.

However, an expert in military and constitutional law said defence officials should not be timid in controlling marijuana use. Not only would the law be on the side of restrictions and precautions, but so would the public.

"Do you want some bozo driving a tank to be strung out? No," said Stuart Hendin, a consultant and peacekeeping trainer with the United Nations, who was previously an instructor at the Royal Military College and Canadian Forces College.

"I think the public expects the military, like the police, will be held to a higher standard." The concept that they lead a different life should be drilled into the expectations of those serving, as should the idea of marijuana restrictions and random drug tests. "The military's function is the management of extreme violence. If you bear that in mind, then the increased restrictions should not be offensive to the community at large," said Hendin.

Lamarre, however, said the military will have to rely on more than just a moral argument. He has ordered up a trove of health research, specifically on "what the impact of marijuana can be on the developing brain," said Lamarre. "We hire the 18-to-25 age group. We want to be aware of what the impact might be on the well-being of those folks who might be consuming this product."

On the legal side, they are looking at what constitutes impairment. There is no government-approved technology to conduct roadside tests for marijuana impairment, and experts argue urine and blood tests are not useful because regular cannabis users can test positive days — even weeks — after the last use.

"How do you deal with that?" Lamarre asks. "Is there a testing technology that is coming around the corner?" And then there is the question of how military messes, or dining halls, treat marijuana. Alcohol is sold there under licensed conditions. Lamarre said whether marijuana would be available under similar circumstances is something they haven't even considered.

[Mark Your Calendar](#)

Wednesday, 14 Feb 2018

Speaker: Chief Constable Del Manak, Victoria Police Department

Topic: The Challenge of Modern Policing in Victoria

Overview: The Victoria Police Department (VPD) is facing new challenges such as the general paradox that although incidents of crime are decreasing, VPD calls are actually increasing, the deadly and expanding opioid crisis in Victoria, increasing numbers of homeless people, dealing with people with mental health issues for which the Police are not normally trained for, new concepts such as Assertive Community Treatment Teams and finally that the legalization of Cannabis may actually increase the workload of local Police Departments on the front line contrary to what our politicians are telling us.

- ◆ **Place:** 5th (BC) Field Regt RCA Officers' Mess, Rm 312, Bay Street Armoury
- ◆ **Time:** 1130 for 1200 Luncheon
- ◆ **Cost:** \$25 (pay at the door)

Our March and April Speakers are yet to be confirmed. We will send out an email when we nail them down and of course you will be advised on your call-outs

"In case you missed the recent email" sent out at the end of January

You will find attached in PDF and Word formats a new advertising paper prepared by Gary del Villano that the Board encourages you to give to potential members. As you know, we are having difficulty maintaining our membership at around 100, so any assistance in recruiting new members is really appreciated.

Separately, we continue to struggle to raise funds for the Military Oral History Endowment at UVic. Large donations anticipated by the original fundraisers have not materialized, so we are stuck at around \$40,000, well short of our needs. We all know the value of the program, with its publicly available archive of over 700 interviews with veterans from World War I onward so any donations that you feel able and willing to give will be well received. The UVic Foundation link is below. Under *Additional Information*, you should type in Military Oral History Endowment.

https://extrweb.uvic.ca/giveonline/onetime?amount=&fund_name=P16485

See the next page for the attachment.



**Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island
Bay Street Armoury, 715 Bay Street
Victoria, BC, V8T 1R1**

The Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island (RUSI-VI) was founded in 1927 to provide a forum for presentations led by featured speakers in support of defence and security issues. In addition, the Institute acts as a link to the general public. It also affords members the opportunity to meet regularly in order to maintain their interest in a broad range of subjects that impact Canada and the world in which we live.

About 150 serving and retired military personnel, as well as police, civilians and those from other nations are members of the RUSI-VI. We are part of RUSI organizations around the world from the United Kingdom, Canada and other Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand.

Members are welcome from all ranks that serve or are retired from the Regular Forces or Reserves, and from civilian walks of life who are interested in issues of defence and security.

A Board of Directors is elected annually from those with former services or from the civilian membership. Lunch meetings take place at noon on Wednesdays of the second week of each month from January to May and September to November at the Bay Street Armoury in Victoria. A meal is served, followed by a guest speaker whose topic is selected from a broad range of subjects. Guests sponsored by members are most welcome to the meetings.

A Newsletter is published quarterly on the internet. While the lunches provide an opportunity to socialize, the RUSI-VI members keep abreast of issues and developments, particularly in terms of defence and security, but also seek to maintain knowledge of wider issues that affect Canada and the world. In addition, the Institute supports the Military Oral History Program in collaboration with the University of Victoria History Department. It also supports Canadian youth in the Cadet programs on Vancouver Island.

Annual membership dues are \$40 per member or \$50 per family. Application forms are available from Institute members or on line at rusivicda.org.

